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TERRORISM: MOTIVATION AND THEORY
Wayne Korbl
University of West Georgia
kkorbl1@my.westga.edu
INTRODUCTION
The following paper attempts to determine motivations behind terrorism
from the perspectives of Rational Choice Theory and Social Solidarity Theory. It
explains difficulties in agreeing on a common definition of terrorism among
different scholars and reviews some of the possible demographic, psychological
and social dynamic causes of terrorism, ultimately concluding that understanding
motivation for terrorist acts cannot be determined uni-dimensionally and that
different levels of terrorist organizations are best understood using different
theories. Individual suicide bombers’ motivations can be best explained by Social
Solidarity Theory, while sponsoring organizations’ motives are best explained by
Rational Choice Theory.
According to Olivier Roy (2006), the original al-Qaida members were of
predominantly Saudi Arabian and Egyptian origin. Thus, these countries are
significantly represented in the paper, to the extent that the example of
mechanical solidarity included below is based on Saudi Arabian history. The
paper examines suicide terrorism, although it also explores other forms of
terrorism. Although this paper examines a pre-Islamic State era of terrorism, some
journalists report that the boundaries of the IS “caliphate” are diminishing and
requiring it to u-turn into an insurgency and competitor to al-Qaida (Marcus,
2017). Thus, these perspectives still contribute to the understanding of the
motivations for past and contemporary terrorism.
SUICIDE TERRORISM FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY
In reviewing the literature concerning terrorism and Rational Choice
Theory, one finds that rational choice is much more accepted in the political
science than sociological discipline, perhaps due in part to RCT’s origin in
economic theory. Early classical theorists outlined sociology by differentiating it
from economic theory. Currently, some theorists are still resistant to the
“colonization” of sociology by RCT (which they call exchange theory [Scott,
2000]), although this may be slowly changing (Hedström & Stern, 2008).
Since an individual characterized by one person as a terrorist will be
characterized by another as a freedom fighter (Bates, 2011; Qirko, 2009;
Shughart, 2011), martyr, revolutionary, insurgent, or common criminal (Shughart,
2011), no definition is unanimously recognized (Atran, 2003; Karoui, 2010; Post,
et al, 2009). However, definitions provided by many scholars (Atran, 2003;
Karoui, 2010; Kydd & Walter, 2006; Pape, 2005; Post, et al, 2009) closely echoed

the Office of the Coordinator, US Department of State definition of terrorism as
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence
an audience” (Shughart, 2011, p.127). As seen below, the theories that these
theorists provide support this definition with the exception that most imply the
attempt to influence multiple audiences instead of just one audience.
In Rational Choice Theory, individuals are seen to be active, rational
agents that determine the best course of action given certain rewards and costs.
Many theorists believe that terrorism can be explained through the lens of RCT.
Shughart believes that terrorists calculate risks and make choices in order to gain
the greatest benefit for the least cost in “money, munitions and manpower” (2011,
p.127). They also shift tactics when states enact countermeasures against them.
Atran (2003) states that the cost of outfitting a Palestinian suicide bomber is $150,
of which transportation to the site is the most expensive item. This cost gains the
sponsor organization increased public support and more prospective bombers.
Bryan Caplan (2006) counters this assertion, also citing Rational Choice. He
believes that the sponsoring organizations have a large motivation to overstate
their influence and willingness to utilize suicide terrorism. and questions why
there are not more bombings given the claims of plentiful recruits and money to
outfit them. Caplan cites the example of two terrorist organizations engaged in a
morbid rivalry in which they tried to outdo each other in the number and
destructiveness of suicide bombings yet completed only five effective attacks per
month. Caplan classifies terrorists into three categories: sympathizers (approve of
but do not enact terrorism), active terrorists (actual members of an organization),
and suicidal terrorists (who actually self-murder for their belief). While he
believes that there are many free riders that gain benefits without incurring cost in
this scenario, he points out that suicide bombing claims 4 to 13 times as many
lives as traditional terrorism and is thus a more effective and destructive form of
terrorism.
But what is the ultimate aim of terrorists? Kydd and Walter (2006) believe
that terrorism amounts to a costly form of signaling to two crucial audiences–
foreign states that they wish to sway and members of their own community that
they wish to gain backing from or whom they wish to dominate. According to
Kydd and Walter, this signaling serves five purposes: attrition (to persuade the
enemy that they will outlast them), intimidation (persuade their population that
they can dominate them without fear of reprisal by the government), provocation
(to incite the enemy to respond violently, which radicalizes the population and
convinces them to support the terrorists), spoiling (undermine any group that tries
to make peace with the enemy), and outbidding (convince their population that
they are best able to battle the enemy rather than alternative groups). Post, et al
(2009) cite Alex Schmid’s Political Terrorism (1983) in which he differentiates

between the target of violence and of attention. He subdivides targets of attention
into 3 groups: 1) the target of terror, same as target of violence; 2) the target of
coercion, that group directly threatened by the terrorists; and 3) the target of
influence, Western countries or other groups that are the ultimate audience of the
act. Schmid also states that terrorism is symbolic, since it aims to challenge a state
or other power that it is unable to overthrow.
Robert Pape believes that “terrorism has two broad purposes: to gain
supporters and to coerce opponents” (2005, p.8). He separates it into 3 categories.
The main purposes of acts of “Demonstrative Terrorism” are to gain publicity for
recruitment purposes, to draw attention of moderates in the opposition and to
draw attention of third parties that might serve to influence the opposition.
Examples of this category are hijacking and hostage taking. The purposes of
“Destructive Terrorism” are coercion and possible gain of support, although this
can backfire due to the increased devastation of the acts. The most violent and
risky form is “Suicide Terrorism.” In this category, coercion is attempted even at
the risk of increased backlash from the opposition or loss of any possibility of
sympathy from neutral parties. The attacker does not expect to survive the act.
Pape states that this is not a new phenomenon, although previously attacks were
more suicide missions than suicide terrorism. He details attacks by the Jewish
Zealots in the first-century AD (see also: Atran, 2003; Stack, 2004), the Shi’ite
sect of Ismaili Assassins (hashashins, see also: Atran, 2003) in the eleventh-and
twelfth-century, and the Japanese Kamikazes of World War II. Like suicide
attackers, the young, educated kamikazes (“divine wind”) volunteered for the task
when they realized that orthodox combat would end in conquest (Atran, 2003;
Bloom, 2005). Unlike suicide terrorists, kamikazes only attacked military targets
and were driven to sacrifice for their country (Momayezi & Momayezi, 2017).
Kamikazes were one of the reasons that Americans supported use of the atomic
bomb (Atran, 2003). Qirko (2009) points out that kamikazes were deeply
influenced by Bushido, the Samurai code of ethical regulation based on Japanese
Shinto belief (Hexham, 1993).
While Bushido may help to explain the motivation of kamikazes, the
motivation of suicide terrorists is less clear. Qirko does not believe that suicide
attackers will only be understood by “scrutinizing their spiritual-intellectual
world, the ideologies that have molded them, and the myths they grew up in”
(2009, p.292). Efficacy and ideology are two competing frameworks proposed by
some researchers (Momayezi & Momayezi, 2017). In contrast to an ideological
framework, Pape (2005) believes that religion, while serving as an effective
recruitment tool, is not the ultimate motivation. He points out that suicide attacks
by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a Marxist-Leninist group of Hindu descent with
members that are steadfastly anti-religion, make up almost twenty-five percent of

the suicide attacks between 1980 and 2003. Qirko (2009) states that the
percentage of secular attacks was half.
In terms of demographic information, Moaddel and Karabenick (2008)
surveyed citizens of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to determine their level of religious
fundamentalism in relation to other variables. They found it to be high for
respondents that relied on religious authorities for religious information, Islamic
orthodoxy, fatalistic attitudes and feelings of insecurity, while being inversely
related to television viewership frequency. While Moaddel and Karabenick
expected university education would contribute to openness of mind toward
members of other faiths, they found that religious fundamentalism was not
affected significantly by university education (2008).
Momayezi and Momayezi (2017) have pointed out that many analyses
have focused on poverty, lack of education, and mental illness, but Pape states
that suicide attackers are not “poor, uneducated, immature religious zealots or
social losers” (2005, p.216). They are usually well educated, socially integrated
individuals from both religious and secular backgrounds (see also: Atran, 2003;
Karoui, 2010; Khalid & Olsson, 2006; Post, et al, 2009; Qirko, 2009; Sutton &
Vertigans, 2005).
Standard psychological theories of suicide seem to lack as well. Pape
(2005) states that what he calls psychological autopsy–analyzing the background,
psychological well-being and suicide-proneness of attackers after the fact–tends
to yield little. Qirko (2009) cites an Islamic Jihad member as saying that any
person that shows a tendency toward suicide is not allowed to become a martyr.
He also points out the lack of explanation in Social Learning Theory as to why
terror organization members from communities not favorable to martyrdom carry
out suicide attacks and those from pro-martyrdom communities may not. Indeed,
Qirko (2009) does not believe that any psychological or social dynamic explains
the cause and that it is merely a politico-strategic choice of a group.
Pape (2005) believes that a three-step process can explain suicide
terrorism--examining the strategic logic of terrorism, the social logic of suicide
terrorism and the individual logic of suicide terrorism. While many scholars have
questioned Pape’s assumptions of strategic logic, his questions of social and
individual logic of suicide terrorism link to Durkheim’s work on Social Solidarity
and suicide, covered below (1893; 1897).
What is the strategic logic of terrorism?
Characteristic of the efficacy framework (Momayezi & Momayezi, 2017),
Pape’s (2005) strategic logic of terrorism posits that if the group did not believe
that terrorism satisfied its agenda, they would not carry it out. He believes that the
organization’s agenda can be explained as a terrorist response to foreign
occupation by modern democracies and as an attempt to coerce these democracies
to withdraw forces from what terrorists consider their homeland. However, in a

paper presented at the “A Culture of Death: On Root Causes of Suicide
Terrorism” conference in May of 2005, Bloom states that Pape’s model glosses
over local partisan undercurrents. She believes that there are multiple and
sometimes-conflicting objectives of suicide attack, including against an occupier,
against alternative groups (outbidding), and against any other group that tries to
make peace with the enemy (spoiling) (2005).
It could be argued that Pape’s emphasis here is his category of “Suicide
Terrorism” and that his other categories of “Demonstrative” and “Destructive
Terrorism” are better able to explain domestic concerns of terrorist organization.
Bloom (2005) also believes that Pape’s model doesn’t take into account religious
and other groups concerned with more than territory and their use of suicide
attacks. She states that his focus on democracies cannot be confirmed since
authoritarian governments don’t allow opposition groups that would engage in
suicide attacks, citing the example of the Muslim Brotherhood’s rally against the
Syrian Ba’athist regime and the government’s elimination of them and their
supporters. Bloom also questions Pape’s characterization of 1980s Sri Lanka,
Israel in the Occupied Territories and Russians in Chechnya as democratic.
Pape (2005) also applies his strategic logic of terrorism model to Osama
bin Laden and al-Qaida. Although American troops were not occupiers in Saudi
Arabia, bin Laden wanted them withdrawn and wanted an end to American
influence in the region. Two years after the 9/11 attacks in the United States, US
troops left Saudi Arabia for Iraq (Kydd & Walter, 2006). However, al-Qaida
stated that the US will continue to be a target until all troops are withdrawn from
the Persian Gulf region and the US discontinues its backing of Israel and
governments such as the Saudi Royal Family and (at the time) Pervez Musharraf
in Pakistan (Abrahms, 2006).
Over the last few decades, according to Pape (2005), organizations have
learned the value of terrorism in convincing American and French military forces
to withdraw from Lebanon in 1983; in convincing Israeli forces to leave Lebanon
in 1985; and in convincing Israeli forces to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank in 1994 and 1995. He believes that after beginning suicide terrorism,
these organizations made more gains in these instances than they had before.
However, Abrahms (2006) conducted a study with findings that ran counter to
Pape’s. In the study, Abrahms investigated the success of groups labeled by the
U.S. Department of State as terrorists, and thus avoiding criticism such as that
levelled at Pape for effectively biasing his study toward terrorist triumphs and
falsely raising the success rate of terrorists (see also: Ashworth, 2008; 2008b;
Pape, 2008). Abrahms (2006) found that Pape’s study focused on only eleven
terrorist campaigns, ten of which targeted the same three countries– Israel, Sri
Lanka, and Turkey (six against Israel alone). Also, Pape does not focus on
whether the campaigns accomplished their principal goals. He considers the 1994

limited withdrawals of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip and West Bank as two
distinct terrorist successes, during which time there was a 167% increase in Israeli
settlers. Abrahms believes that Pape’s study therefore finds that terrorist groups
sometimes achieved strategic successes, not that terrorism is an effective policy.
Pape (2005) states that terrorist organizations recognize that they are
smaller and weaker than Western forces. They must make their trainees as
effective and efficient as possible (Qirko, 2009). In short, barring access to a
nuclear weapon, suicide bombing is the most reliable and deadly method available
to them (Pape, 2005).
What is the social logic of suicide terrorism? Terrorist organizations could
not continue without support from the community from which they recruit. As
long as they are seen as pursuing the legitimate goal of liberating the community
from foreign occupation, they receive broad support from it (Pape, 2005).
What is the individual logic of suicide terrorism? Pape (2005) believes
that most suicide attackers fit the profile for altruistic suicide as developed by
Emile Durkheim–that their extreme level of social integration and deference to
community values lead them to commit suicide from a sense of duty instead of
seeing the act as murder.
SUICIDE TERRORISM FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIAL
SOLIDARITY THEORY
At the time that Emile Durkheim was writing The Division of Labour in
Society (1893) and Suicide (1897), France was transitioning from an agricultural,
male-controlled Catholic society to a modern, industrial nation. This shift was
opposed by religious and military hierarchy and the landed aristocracy. In contrast
with these groups, Durkheim favored the individualism, secularism and free
market belief characteristic of modernity–within reason. He believed
individualism should be rooted in social institutions and ethical focus (Seidman,
2008). Similar to the French transition from agrarian to modern, Saudi Arabia’s
transition from a tribal land resistant to Ottoman rule to the oil-rich, Sa’udiWahhabi Empire of today has been one of conflict.
Durkheim’s theory of Social Solidarity postulates that there are two types
of society–that of mechanical solidarity and that of organic solidarity. Mechanical
solidarity involves a segmental society of self-sufficient clan-bases (Durkheim,
2013). These clan-bases are traditional and conservative, with a unified religious
culture. Any behavior considered deviant is dealt with harshly as it poses a threat
to social unity. Societies with organic solidarity are specialized; different
institutions maintain different expertise and understanding. These institutions are
thus interdependent. Cultural pluralism is prevalent and the law is concerned more
with contracts and advocates ideals of restitution as opposed to the punitive type
of punishment characteristic of mechanical society. In effect, the scope of

common knowledge and common culture lessens until the only common belief is
that of individualism, becoming society’s public religion (Seidman, 2008).
Looking at the beginnings of the Saudi royal family, one can see a good
example of a mechanical society. According to Al-Rasheed (2010), in 1727,
Muhammad ibn Sa’ud was Amir of Dir'iyyah, a village of less than 70 households
in Najd. The al-Sa’ud were sedentary, landholding merchants. As such,
Muhammad ibn Sa’ud lacked tribal affiliation or excess capital with which to
expand his influence over territory or trading routes. This changed when al-Sa’ud
met Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and embraced Wahhabism in 1744. Abd alWahhab had been expelled by another nearby Amir for engaging in punitive
punishment, publicly stoning a woman accused of fornication. Abd al-Wahhab
espoused a pure form of traditional Islamic monotheism, including a strict
interpretation of shari’a law that would not allow deviancy to pose a threat to
social unity. He needed a political partner with whom to further this vision. Abd
al-Wahhab advocated zakat, a religious tax given to the needy but, in effect, tax to
the ruler. In return, Muhammad ibn Sa’ud would be obliged to wage jihad against
those that did not follow the traditional, conservative doctrines of this unified
religious culture. This commitment to rid Arabia of heretical religion served as
reason for expansion by conquest, resulting ultimately in the nation of Saudi
Arabia with state religion of Wahabbism (2010).
Some posit that this type of society with a pure form of traditional Islamic
monotheism and a strict interpretation of shari’a law that would not allow
deviancy to pose a threat to social unity is the society that al-Qaida, the Taliban
and other Salafist groups would like to return to, although some sociologists
disagree (Van Biema & Crumley, 2003). It is interesting to note that, in
attempting to achieve a return to mechanical solidarity, groups like al-Qaida have
succeeded in building organizations that best represent organic solidarity. AlQaida is multi-national, with different interdependent divisions for financing,
strategic planning, training, carrying out attacks, etc.
Continuing with his work on Social Solidarity Theory, Durkheim
published Suicide in 1897. In it, he proposed two continuums that offered insight
into suicide. The first continuum (social integration) has egoistic suicide on one
end and altruistic suicide on the other. Social integration is the level of connection
between the person and society. The second continuum (social regulation) has
anomic suicide on one end and fatalistic suicide on the other. Social regulation
indicates the person’s social wants and how they interact with the norms and
boundaries imposed by society.
Egoistic suicide is a lack of social integration. Lacking social goals, the
person loses purpose and meaning and becomes self-absorbed and isolated
(Seidman, 2008; Sutton & Vertigans, 2005). It is marked by high individualism.
Durkheim found that Protestants had higher suicide rates than Catholics and

believed that this was due to the individualistic nature of Protestantism, as
opposed to the social integration of Catholicism (Seidman, 2008). This is also
characteristic of “egoistic lone wolf terrorists” that identify “with an agenda, but
not an organization” (Bates, 2011, p. 7).
In contrast, altruistic suicide can be seen as an excess of social integration,
to the point of conformity. A person’s individuality becomes secondary to the
needs, interests, and identity of a group. The individual becomes so enmeshed
with the group that threats to it can lead to suicide. Durkheim cites the example of
the soldier that dies to save his brothers-in-arms (Seidman, 2008; Sutton &
Vertigans, 2005). Bates cites suicide terrorists from Al Qaeda and Hamas as
examples of “altruistic suicide terrorists” (2011, p. 7). Durkheim further divides
altruistic suicide into obligatory, optional and acute altruistic suicide. In the
obligatory type, the suicide is seen as a cultural norm and the person’s duty, often
to having been shamed. Stack (2004) states that failure to suicide can often lead to
punishment by the group. In the optional category, suicide is not seen as a duty
but as an option communicated to the individual, often from an early age. The
individuals sometimes achieve high status in the group as a result of their death.
In the acute altruistic category, suicide is “purely for the joy of sacrifice”
(Durkheim, 1951, p.223). Durkheim gives the example of Christian martyrs. This
best characterizes most suicide bombers that have lost themselves and choose to
suicide for their group and a higher power (Sutton & Vertigans, 2005). Stack
(2004) states that altruistic suicide has four significant characteristics: extreme
social integration, much public support (from the group), a profit to the group
materially or culturally, and is characterized by tremendous positive emotion.
In terms of the social regulation continuum, in anomic suicide the person
needs social and moral direction. Durkheim believed people structured their
needs, wishes and goals in reference to society. Lack of stability, such as in
economic crises (or economic booms), keeps them from being able to do this in a
consistent way. Security forces in the West are concerned about second and third
generation individuals from previous migrations/diasporas that find it difficult to
integrate into a new culture and feel stateless. Although not previously devout,
their anomie and search for stability leads them to extremist mosques or into
contact with charismatic clerics (Post, et al, 2009) and they become “anomic
insurgent terrorists” (Bates, 2011, p. 6). This is also found to be a problem for
new immigrants or foreign students studying in the West (Khalid & Olsson,
2006).
Opposite anomic suicide on the social regulation continuum is fatalistic
suicide in which the social rules and norms are so intrusive and confining the
individual can’t envision progress. This category was undeveloped by Durkheim.
He cites the example of slaves. This category can be seen to characterize some
suicide attackers, particularly those of Palestine in response to Israeli occupation.

Another example of “fatalistic suicide terrorists” is Chechen female suicide
bombers (“Black Widows”) (Bates, 2011, p. 7). The desperation can be found in a
quote by the mother of the second intifada's first female martyr, Wafa Idris, “She
was young, intelligent, and beautiful, and had nothing to live for” (Sutton, &
Vertigans, 2005, p.69) and in a quote by an elderly Jenin woman to a reporter,
“Look how we live here. Then maybe you'll understand why there are always
volunteers for martyrdom. Every good Muslim understands that it's better to die
fighting than to live without hope” (Post, et al, 2009, p.19).
As has been seen in this section, individual terrorists’ motivations are best
explained by Social Solidarity Theory. Terrorist acts such as those by Palestinians
against Israel can best be explained by Emile Durkheim’s concept of Fatalistic
suicide, while Anomic suicide best explains terrorist acts by second generation
and student immigrants and Altruistic suicide best characterizes most suicide
bombers.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In considering the perspectives of Rational Choice Theory and Social
Solidarity Theory to try to determine motivations behind suicide terrorism, it has
been found that both appear to help one gain insight into the phenomenon.
Individual suicide bombers’ motivations can be explained by Durkheim’s suicide
types, while sponsoring organizations’ motives are more political, and thus best
viewed as rational choice. An explanation for this is suggested by Bloom (2005)
and Kydd and Walter (2006), who state that the individual must be considered
separately from the organization. However, individuals and organizations can
both be seen as acting rationally as their actions can be seen as consistent with
choosing options most likely to realize their objectives (Bloom, 2005). This seems
confusing at first. However, an element of Rational Choice Theory is
methodological individualism, where: “The elementary unit of social life is the
individual human action. To explain social institutions and social change is to
show how they arise as the result of the action and interaction of individuals”
(Scott, 2000, p.127). Thus one sees elements of this theory when looking at the
individual and the organization.
Therefore, in viewing societies as whole, speaking of mechanical and
organic solidarity is useful, especially in explaining what type of society is
preferred and which one is denounced by terrorists. In examining the sponsoring
organizations, Rational Choice Theory is most useful, although one will see this at
work at the individual level as well.
In searching for the motives of the suicide attackers themselves, the more
useful tactic is to look at individual responses to different levels of social
integration and social regulation and the categories of altruistic, anomic and
fatalistic suicide. Emile Durkheim’s acute altruistic suicide best characterizes
most suicide bombers that have lost themselves and choose to suicide for the

group. His category of anomic suicide explains second and third generation
individuals from previous migrations/diasporas whose anomie leads them to
extremist mosques where they become radicalized, homegrown terrorists. His
category of fatalistic suicide in which social norms are so invasive that the
individual can’t imagine improvement best characterizes Palestinian suicide
attackers responding to Israeli occupation.
It is possible that motivation for suicide attackers is an example of “the
end justifies the means” and thus could best be explained by Robert Merton’s
(1938) study of the lack of coordination between means and end processes. A
disproportionate emphasis on culture goals and product could exert pressure
resulting in nonconformist behavior limited only by technical rather than
institutional norms and process. However, the question still becomes which
culture is utilized to define the “aspirations and socially structured means” (1938,
p. 674) whereby the terrorist countermores are generated and would that culture
be considered a mechanical or organic society? Would this be an example of a
mechanical society engaging in “rebellious conduct … to refashion the social
framework” (1938, p. 682) of a more organic society? This is an interesting
question that should be addressed in future research.
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